In Iran, the Large Winner Is Not one of the Above
For the reason that dying in Could of President Ebrahim Raisi, Iran has been within the throes of a shock electoral contest. Not for the primary time, one of many loudest campaigns has belonged to not any of the candidates, however to opponents of the regime who advocate boycotting the vote. Amongst those that refused to vote on June 28 have been the Nobel Peace Prize laureates Shirin Ebadi and Narges Mohammadi, the labor chief Esmayil Bakhshi, former Prime Minister Mirhossein Mousavi (underneath home arrest since 2011 for main the Inexperienced Motion protests), and Mostafa Tajzadeh, a outstanding reformist turned critic who’s in jail.
Now the first-round outcomes are in, and so they counsel a grand victory for the boycotters. On election day, so few Iranians got here out to vote by 6 p.m., when the polls have been as a consequence of shut, that the regime prolonged voting hours all the best way to midnight (the authorized most). And but, even when the inside ministry’s numbers are to be believed, turnout climbed no increased than 39.9 p.c, by far the bottom within the historical past of the Islamic Republic.
The earlier presidential election, in 2021, was a lot much less aggressive—successfully a coronation for Raisi—and turnout was 49.9 p.c. This time round, not even the inclusion of a reformist candidate, Masud Pezeshkian, who had the complete help of once-popular former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani, introduced voters to the polls. Nor did the tireless campaigning of former Overseas Minister Javad Zarif. The Iranian regime urges its supporters to vote as an act of fealty to the Islamic Republic, so refusing to vote is historically understood as an expression of dissent in opposition to the regime and its insurance policies. And the message this 12 months is evident: Within the first presidential election for the reason that Girls, Life, Freedom protests of 2022–23, nearly all of Iranians are making clear with their voting habits, simply as they did within the streets, that they reject the Islamic Republic.
And so one would possibly count on that the reformist candidate, who would have been the likeliest selection for many who stayed dwelling, would have been the largest loser. It has lengthy been held axiomatic in Iran that low voter turnout will ship a victory to the hard-liners. However Pezeshkian shocked many by topping the ballot on Friday with 42.5 p.c of the vote, which sends him to a runoff, to be held on July 5, in opposition to Saeed Jalili, a fundamentalist hard-liner who got here away with 38.6 p.c. To many critics of the regime, even a few of those that voted for Pezeshkian, the end result was superb: an expression of mass dissatisfaction that also managed to place a reformist within the lead.
![Masoud Pezeshkian against a sky background](https://i0.wp.com/cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/h7zMbypRxXoiqvNrzIWzSbHZdQg=/0x0:4050x2700/655x437/media/img/posts/2024/07/HR_16224062/original.jpg?resize=640%2C427&ssl=1)
The most important loser on Friday was the truth is Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the wily speaker of Parliament and a former commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), a militia that wields nice financial and army energy in Iran. Operating on a technocratic agenda, the conservative Qalibaf had began the race because the presumed front-runner, hoping to enchantment to each hard-line voters and people extra important of the regime. Finally, he happy neither quarter, misplaced each, and obtained simply 13.8 p.c of the vote. The consequence is a humiliation not just for Qalibaf but additionally for the IRGC. The militia’s media retailers supported Qalibaf, however a lot of its rank-and-file clearly most well-liked the out-and-out extremist, Jalili. Qalibaf has dutifully endorsed Jalili, regardless that his marketing campaign attacked Jalili for weeks, and his agenda is in some ways nearer to Pezeshkian’s.
Opponents of the regime can have fun Friday’s low turnout as proof that almost all Iranians share their disgust with your complete system and don’t want to legitimize it with their vote. However now they face a dilemma. Ought to they boycott the second spherical on July 5 and permit Jalili to cruise into the presidency? Or ought to they forged a lesser-evil vote for the reformist Pezeshkian?
Jalili’s extremism can’t be overstated. Many conservatives concede that Iran wants to interact in talks with the West to minimize the stress of sanctions. However Jalili leads a hard-core faction that believes Iran ought to principally surrender on the West. His grand foreign-policy thought in the course of the presidential debates was promoting greens to Russia. When he led Iran’s nuclear negotiations from 2007 to 2013, his stubborn refusal to look at probably the most primary norms of diplomatic talks led to stalemate. A European diplomat just lately recalled to me that Jalili as soon as spent an essential assembly delivering an interminable lecture in regards to the topic of his Ph.D. dissertation, the Prophet Mohammad’s diplomatic engagements within the seventh century. Iran is on a blacklist, held by the Paris-based Monetary Motion Process Drive, that severely limits its worldwide commerce not simply with Western nations but additionally with China; Jalili, even in line with IRGC media retailers, has used his appreciable affect behind the scenes to stop Iran from taking the transparency measures that will enable it to come back off that listing, the place its solely remaining firm consists of North Korea and Myanmar.
![Supporters of Saeed Jalili at a campaign rally](https://i0.wp.com/cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/ONaILkpSMQR2uA_ghc72sMOXarY=/0x0:6000x4000/655x437/media/img/posts/2024/07/GettyImages_2158735499/original.jpg?resize=640%2C427&ssl=1)
![posters of Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf on the floor](https://i0.wp.com/cdn.theatlantic.com/thumbor/An9f3oKDT7rHbRlZa3Ueo-wC0YA=/0x0:6000x4000/655x437/media/img/posts/2024/07/GettyImages_2158923661/original.jpg?resize=640%2C427&ssl=1)
Jalili’s home agenda additionally reeks of fundamentalism. Amirhossein Sabeti, a rising younger member of Parliament and an in depth Jalili-campaign adviser, just lately mentioned that the safety forces ought to assault ladies who refuse to abide by the obligatory veiling guidelines “like a warfare on medicine, harshly and with out exception.” Sabeti has additionally requested for additional restrictions on the web and a crackdown on VPN know-how that permits Iranians to bypass the ban on fashionable apps equivalent to WhatsApp and Instagram. One other Jalili supporter has advocated capital punishment for these promoting VPN software program.
Pezeshkian’s marketing campaign and others who oppose Jalili have begun sounding alarms. On Sunday, a centrist outlet predicted {that a} Jalili presidency can be “politically like North Korea and culturally just like the Taliban’s Afghanistan.” Pezeshkian supporters, equivalent to former Communications Minister Javad Azari-Jahromi, have used related rhetoric. However a unfavorable marketing campaign gained’t be sufficient to beat the deep skepticism the reformists face. Pezeshkian doesn’t have agency positions of his personal to level to on points such because the obligatory hijab. And plenty of Iranians really feel that Supreme Chief Ali Khamenei, along with unelected our bodies, controls all political outcomes to a level that makes voting for Pezeshkian fruitless, particularly when doing so means rising the turnout.
Amirhossein Mosalla, a reformist activist, informed me he would boycott the second spherical simply as he did the primary.
“I gained’t vote,” he mentioned on Sunday, “as a result of Jalili’s considering is already being applied and Pezeshkian has supplied no technique to counter unelected establishments such because the Guardian Council or the hard-liner-dominated Parliament.”
Some critics of the regime go additional: Embracing a model of accelerationism, they argue {that a} Jalili presidency is finally higher for the opposition, as a result of the regime will develop ever extra remoted and thus extra susceptible to being overthrown.
For these of us with an extended historic reminiscence, the July 5 election is eerily paying homage to one other contest held 19 years in the past.
In 2005, a younger hard-line mayor of Tehran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, shocked many by getting extra votes than the primary conservative candidate, Qalibaf, and making it to the runoff. There he confronted Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a centrist regime stalwart. Many reformists, and others in Iran’s civil society, urged their constituents to vote for Rafsanjani in an effort to vanquish Ahmadinejad, calling it an try and “defeat fascism.” They likened the competition to the 2002 elections in France, the place the left supported the center-right Jacques Chirac to defeat the far-right candidate within the second spherical. I bear in mind Hossein Masoumi Hamedani, an mental and a literature professor, pleading with me to vote for Rafsanjani, after I was a 17-year-old leftist who would have none of it. (The voting age in Iran was 15 on the time.) Why vote for Rafsanjani, I responded, who would assist lengthen the regime, when Ahmadinejad may assist “heighten the contradictions”?
Many younger individuals adopted this logic. And Ahmadinejad did win that 12 months, and he did make Iran ever extra remoted, sanctioned, and crisis-ridden. However this didn’t result in democratization or regime collapse. Relatively, the political repression and financial malaise received worse and worse; Rafsanjani’s political defeat gave extra energy to Khamenei and the hard-liners, to not the democratic motion.
Maybe I’ve mellowed with age, however I now want we had supported Rafsanjani again in 2005. At 76, Hamedani is calling for a vote for Pezeshkian, and he now makes extra sense to me. The considered a President Jalili holding any energy at this significant juncture in Iranian historical past scares me—particularly after we keep in mind that he may form the end result of the succession disaster that’s positive to interrupt when the 85-year-old Khamenei lastly dies.